There is also debate over whether Y can owe R gratitude for φ-ing if R was obligated to φ, or if Y had a right to R’s φ-ing. Heyd (1982), Weiss (1985), Walker (1980–1981), Card (1988), and Macnamara (2019) all argue that Y does not owe gratitude to R for doing something R was already obligated to do anyway or that Y had a right to, and that gratitude is owed only in response to supererogatory acts.
Other philosophers disagree, citing various counterexamples.
Simmons (1979), for instance, claims that I owe gratitude to a good Samaritan who stops to offer me assistance, even though such acts are obligatory.
Lyons (1969) argues that while I may not owe gratitude to a lifeguard for saving my life, I may owe him gratitude for having freely taken up the obligation to do so.
Gratitude Apprentice 