The precise content of grateful beliefs may vary, depending on the nature of the act of beneficence in response to which they are called for.
They may, for instance, include the belief, on Y’s part, that benefactor R is especially brave, or especially thoughtful, or especially self-sacrificing.
They may include the belief, on Y’s part, that R cares a great deal about Y (Berger 1975), and perhaps, relatedly, that Y is worthy of being cared about to such an extent (Shaw 2013, Manela 2019).
A beneficiary who failed to judge that an act of beneficence had been performed would be unlikely to have the feelings or exhibit the behaviors a grateful person ought to have and do (see sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 below).
Such feelings and behaviors, after all, do not arise ex nihilo in normal people, so without a sufficient reason, we would expect them not to arise.
As a response to beneficence, gratitude seems to include certain judgments or beliefs—at the very least, the belief that an act of beneficence has occurred (Berger 1975: 302; Walker 1980–1981: 51; Manela 2019).
In the absence of such judgments, we would be hard pressed to call a beneficiary grateful.
A beneficiary who failed to judge that an act of beneficence had been performed would be unlikely to have the feelings or exhibit the behaviors a grateful person ought to have and do (see sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 below).
The elements of the grateful response can be broken down into four categories: cognitive, affective, communicative, and conative.
whether gratitude is owed is not necessarily settled once and for all in the moment that R φ’s.
Even if R’s φ-ing makes it the case that Y owes R gratitude, some future harm or wrong on R’s part might render Y’s gratitude for R’s φ-ing no longer called for (McConnell 1993: 29–30).
This might happen if, for example, R recklessly or malevolently destroys a gift she gave Y. Gratitude may also cease to be called for if R, subsequent to gratitude-worthily φ-ing, demands a return or compensation for having φ-ed (insofar as such a demand would seem to render R’s φ-ing more of a loan than a gratitude-worthy act of benevolence or beneficence) (Weiss 1985), or tries to use the fact of his having φ-ed to manipulate Y by guilting him into doing something.
Philosophers also debate whether certain features of the beneficiary are necessary for gratitude to be owed. Simmons (1979), for instance, claims that Y owes R no gratitude for benefits R forced on Y against Y’s will.
Furthermore, it seems, Y must want R’s benefit in order for gratitude to be called for. If R delivers a benefit without Y’s desire or consent to receive it, this may betray a disregard for Y’s autonomy that would ultimately undermine R’s desert of gratitude (Berger 1975; Camenisch 1981; Meilaender 1984: 168).
This condition seems too stringent in cases where a beneficiary desperately needs a benefit but is not able to accept it, say, because of incapacitation.
In response to such worries, Simmons adds the proviso that if Y does not actually want the benefit, it may suffice for gratitude to be owed that Y would want the benefit if certain “impairing conditions” (such as drunkenness, mental disorder or ignorance) were removed.
Still, some philosophers think gratitude may be called for in the absence of both Y’s desire and such impairing conditions.
McConnell (1993), for instance, argues that a child who accepts an offer of college tuition from a benefactor owes that benefactor gratitude, even if she does not want to go to college.
There is also debate over whether Y can owe R gratitude for φ-ing if R was obligated to φ, or if Y had a right to R’s φ-ing. Heyd (1982), Weiss (1985), Walker (1980–1981), Card (1988), and Macnamara (2019) all argue that Y does not owe gratitude to R for doing something R was already obligated to do anyway or that Y had a right to, and that gratitude is owed only in response to supererogatory acts.
Other philosophers disagree, citing various counterexamples.
Simmons (1979), for instance, claims that I owe gratitude to a good Samaritan who stops to offer me assistance, even though such acts are obligatory.
Lyons (1969) argues that while I may not owe gratitude to a lifeguard for saving my life, I may owe him gratitude for having freely taken up the obligation to do so.
Most philosophers allow that R may have other motives for φ-ing, noting that our motives are almost always mixed (see, e.g., McConnell 1993
According to Fitzgerald, Y’s gratitude to R for harming him might be called for if there was some benefit that came about for Y because of that harm.
Thus it might be the case that the Dalai Lama, Fitzgerald argues, should be grateful to the Chinese government for persecuting him, insofar as that persecution gave him the opportunity to become more virtuous.
Manela (2016a) disputes this, arguing that it is more accurate to say that the Dalai Lama should appreciate the opportunity the Chinese gave him by trying to harm him but should not be grateful to them for “providing” it.
Most philosophers hold that Y owes R gratitude only if R φ-ed intentionally.
Some philosophers have argued that gratitude is not warranted in response to all intentional acts, but only those that are voluntary
Gratitude Apprentice 